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PHARMACISTS WITHOUT REMEDIES MEANS SERIOUS SIDE
EFFECTS FOR PATIENTS: THIRD CIRCUIT DENIES PENNSYLVANIA
PHARMACISTS STANDING TO CHALLENGE REIMBURSEMENT
RATES UNDER MEDICAID ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Providing health care for low-income individuals has always been
problematic in the profit-driven health care industry, and it is only getting
worse. Medicaid,' a joint federal-state health care program, currently cov-
ers forty-two million Americans, and that figure is projected to increase in
fiscal year 2003.2 As a result, states are coming up short in funding for
Medicaid and are looking for ways to cut costs. 3 Thirty-seven states plan to
cut costs by reducing or freezing reimbursement rates to Medicaid provid-
ers.4 Pharmacies that participate in Medicaid are getting hit hard by the
reduction in reimbursement rates and are losing money on Medicaid
transactions. 5
1. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Overview of the Medi-
caid Program, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/mover.asp (last visited Jan. 19,
2003) (defining Medicaid as program that "provides medical assistance for certain
individuals and families with low incomes and resources. The program.., became
law in 1965 as a jointly funded cooperative venture between the Federal and State
governments to assist States in the provision of adequate medical care to eligible
needy persons"). The Medicaid program is codified in Title XIX of the Social
Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)-1396v (2002) (providing codification of
Medicaid program); see also 5 WEST FED. ADMIN. PRAc. § 6323 (Christopher Kelley
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002) (distinguishing Medicaid from Medicare).
2. SeeVERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH: A 50 STATE UPDATE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 (Jan.
2003), at http://www.kff.org/content/2003/20030113/4082.pdf (surveying all
fifty states on individual Medicaid budgets); see also Press Release, Kaiser Comm'n
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 49 States Have Planned or Implemented Medi-
caid Cuts in FY2003; 32 of Them Have Taken Action Twice (Jan. 13, 2003), at
http://www.kff.org/content/2003/20030113/an13rls.pdf (summarizing surveys'
findings of impact of state budget constraints on Medicaid programs).
3. See Smith, supra note 2, at 9-13 (citing methods states use to cut costs, in-
cluding: provider rate reductions or freezes, containing prescription drug costs,
benefit limits or eliminations, eligibility cuts and restrictions, beneficiary co-pay-
ments and long-term care reduction strategies).
4. See id. at 9, 21 app. B (exhibiting number of states planning cost contain-
ment strategies in Fiscal Year 2003).
5. See, e.g., Court Stops Indiana Medicaid Rate Cuts, at http://
www.pharmacist.com/articles/h_lr_0002.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (noting
state court granted injunction blocking state from implementing reductions in
Medicaid reimbursement for prescription drugs); Rick Harding, Massachusetts Ends
Medicaid Feud with Chains, at http://www.pharmacist.com/articles/hts_0074.cfm
(last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (reporting that state agreed to maintain current reim-
bursement rates to pharmacies in face of threats from major pharmacies to pull
out of Medicaid program); Press Release, Kentucky Pharmacists Association, Ken-
tucky Retail Federation and American Pharmacy Services Corp. (Jan. 21, 2002), at
(1377)
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Pharmacies may elect to participate as Medicaid service providers. 6
Until the Third Circuit's decision in Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n v. Hous-
toun,7 a participating pharmacy had the option to challenge state reim-
bursement rates by asserting a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of the Equal Access provision (§ 30(A)) of the Medicaid Act
(hereinafter § 30(A) or Equal Access provision). 8 Section 30(A) requires
states to "assure" that Medicaid recipients have adequate access to Medi-
caid providers and services and specifies requirements for payments to
providers. 9 Several other circuits have concluded that § 30(A) creates an
enforceable right that may be challenged in a § 1983 action by relying on
Supreme Court precedent that concluded that another provision of the
Medicaid Act, the Boren Amendment, creates an enforceable right. 10
With the repeal of the Boren Amendment in 1997, however, the validity of
these circuit court decisions has been called into question.' 1
http://www.kphanet.org/Medicaid%20Press%20Release.htm ("Pharmacies facing
increased economic pressures may be forced to close if their reimbursement drops
further, ultimately creating a situation in which Medicaid patients may not have
access to a pharmacy in their area when a prescription medication is needed."); Rx
for a Medicaid Nightmare? (Mar. 11, 2002), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2002/03/11/health/printable5O3465.shtml ("Drugstores around the nation are
threatening to stop serving Medicaid patients, close or reduce hours if cash-
strapped states follow through on plans to cut the amounts paid to pharmacies for
filling Medicaid prescriptions."). But see State Programs Overpaying for Generic Drugs,
HHS IG Report Says, 7 HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (BNA) (Mar. 15, 2002) (noting that
state Medicaid programs "could save hundreds of millions of dollars if they reim-
bursed generic drugs at a rate closer to the actual acquisition costs of those
drugs . . . . This formula is causing the Medicaid program to overpay . . . for
drugs").
6. See Nancy De Lew, The First 30 Years of Medicare and Medicaid, 274 JAMA 262,
266 (1995) (listing prescription drug service as optional service that states can elect
to offer).
7. 283 F.3d 531 (3d Cir. 2002).
8. For a discussion of Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun and its impli-
cations on Medicaid providers' standing to assert § 1983 actions for violations of
§ 30(A), see infra notes 90-129 and accompanying text.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A) (2002) (requiring adequate access for
Medicaid recipients to Medicaid providers and Medicaid services).
10. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir.
1996) (holding Medicaid providers have standing to challenge violations of
§ 30(A) of Medicaid Act in § 1983 action); Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91
F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d
519, 528 (8th Cir. 1993) (deciding that Section 30(A) creates enforceable right on
Medicaid providers); Minn. Homecare Ass'n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir.
1997) (allowing Medicaid providers to assert violations of § 30(A) of Medicaid
Act). But see Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[As a
Medicaid provider], Walgreen does not appear to be an intended beneficiary of
§ 30(A)."); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 928 (5th
Cir. 2000) ("[Section] 30(A) does not create an 'individual entitlement' for indi-
vidual providers to a particular level of payment because it does not directly ad-
dress those providers.").
11. See, e.g., Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 540 n.15 (stating that one of
Congress's objectives in repealing Boren Amendment was to take away Medicaid
providers' right to sue under § 1983); Joel M. Hamme, The Business Environment:
1378
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In Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n, the Third Circuit held in a 6-5 deci-
sion that pharmacists do not have standing to challenge state reimburse-
ment rates under § 1983 for violations of § 30(A) because pharmacists are
not the intended beneficiaries of the Medicaid Act. 12 Additionally, subse-
quent Supreme Court case law has heightened the standing requirements
for asserting a civil rights action under § 1983, indicating that the Third
Circuit's holding will remain intact.13
This Casebrief explains the Third Circuit's approach to heightening
the standing requirements in § 1983 actions for violations of the Medicaid
Act in light of its decision in Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n. Furthermore,
this Casebrief argues that while the Third Circuit's decision was correctly
decided under the law, it has adverse policy implications for the Medicaid
program.
Part II discusses pertinent aspects of the Medicaid Act, focusing on
the similarities between § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act and the Boren
Amendment and the effects of the eventual repeal of the Amendment on
Medicaid provider rights. 14 Additionally, this section will discuss Medicaid
providers' § 1983 remedies under the Act.1 5 Part III discusses how other
circuits have addressed the issue of Medicaid provider standing under
§ 1983, comparing circuit court decisions before and after the repeal of
the Boren Amendment. 16 Part TV analyzes the Third Circuit's recent con-
struction of the intended beneficiary requirement as applied to Medicaid
providers.' 7 Moreover, this section critiques the court's decision from a
policy perspective and offers advice for practitioners asserting § 1983 ac-
tions in the Third Circuit.' 8 Part V provides a summary of the issues
Special Legal Concerns-Long-term Care and the Medicaid Program: Past, Present, and
Future, in 3 HEALTH LAw PRAcTICE GUIDE § 33.8 (2002) (questioning future of
Medicaid providers' ability to bring § 1983 action for violations of § 30(A) in other
circuits).
12. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 541-42 (foreclosing Medicaid pro-
vider remedies under § 1983).
13. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 523 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) ("We now reject the
notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right
to support a cause of action brought under § 1983."); see also Suter v. Artist M., 503
U.S. 347, 364 (1992) (noting that statute "neither confers an enforceable private
right... nor creates an implied cause of action").
14. For a discussion of the background of the Medicaid program, the Boren
Amendment and its eventual repeal, see infra notes 19-51 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of Medicaid providers' § 1983 remedies, see infra notes
52-67 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of circuit court cases denying and granting standing to
Medicaid providers, including the Third Circuit's precedent prior to Pennsylvania
Pharmacists Ass'n, see infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning in Pennsylvania Pharma-
cists Ass'n, see infra notes 90-129. For a critical discussion of adverse policy implica-
tions of the Third Circuit's decision, see infta notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
18. For advice to practitioners contemplating § 1983 actions in the Third Cir-
cuit, see infra notes 144-48.
13792003] CASEBRIEF
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presented and concludes that the Third Circuit's decision could lead to
reduced benefits for Medicaid recipients.
II. BACKGROUND
A. How Does Medicaid Work?
In 1965, Congress enacted the Medicaid Act to create a federal and
state subsidized public health insurance program for low-income Ameri-
cans.' 9 Under the Act, in exchange for federal funding, participating
states agree to comply with the Medicaid Act and applicable federal regu-
lations. 2° Medicaid consists of both mandatory services that participating
states must offer and optional additional services that states can elect to
offer. 2' One of the options states can elect to offer is a prescription drug
service.22
19. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)-1396v (2002) (outlining procedures for state
plans for Medicaid assistance). Because Medicaid is a joint federal and state pro-
gram, states must elect to participate. See Malcolm J. Harkins III, Be Careful What
You Ask For: The Repeal of the Boren Amendment and Continuing Federal Responsibility to
Assure that State Medicaid Programs Pay for Cost Effective Quality Nursing Care, 4 J.
HEAUTH CARE L. & POL'V 159, 162-69 (2001) (providing thorough explanation of
how Medicaid program is administered).
20. See Harkins, supra note 19, at 162 (explaining requirements of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.300-.304 (2002) (providing purpose of regula-
tions, definitions, state plan requirements and upper limits of Medicaid reimburse-
ments to Medicaid providers); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.331-.334 (2002) (specifying
regulations relating to prescription drugs).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (2002) (defining eligible recipients for
medical assistance); 42 C.F.R. § 440.210(a) (2001) (describing required services
under Medicaid).
22. See42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (12) (listing prescription drugs as one of optional
services under Medicaid); 42 C.F.R. § 440.120(a) (2001) (defining prescribed
drugs). The majority of states, including Pennsylvania, contract with pharmacies
who elect to participate for prescription drug services under a "managed care"
program. See Stephen Zuckerman, Alison Evans &John Holahan, Urban Institute,
Questions for States as They Turn to Medicaid Managed Care, at http://www.urban.org/
tem plate.cfm?Template=/TaggedCon ten t/ViewPublica-
tion.cfm&PublicationlD=5903&NavMenulD=95 (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (dis-
cussing prevalence of managed care programs among states). The study reports:
The number of Americans enrolled in managed care has grown dramati-
cally during the 1990s, as private and public purchasers of health care
turn to managed care as a way of providing more cost-effective delivery of
health services .... The private sector has already achieved substantial
savings through managed care. State Medicaid programs are increasing
their use of managed care in the hope of achieving similar success.
Id.
The three main types of managed care programs include Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Point of
Service Plans (POSs). See Health and Human Services (HHS), Managed Care Termi-
nology, at http://cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/managedcare/default.asp (last visited
Feb. 10, 2003) (defining commonly used managed care terms).
1380 [Vol. 48: p. 1377
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Typically, Medicaid has been administered in two ways: (1) through a
managed care program or (2) through a "fee for service" program. 23
Managed care programs involve agreements with groups of specific doc-
tors and other providers and require plan members to use only those spec-
ified providers. 24 In contrast, a fee for service program gives plan
members more health care provider choices, but does not reimburse plan
members until after they are billed for the health service. 25
In the context of Medicaid, the majority of states has switched from a
fee for service program to a managed care program in an effort to reduce
costs. 26 As a result, pharmacies now enter into standard contracts with
their state's Public Welfare Department to provide specific prescription
drugs to beneficiaries and set reimbursement rates.27 Historically, when a
dispute over the adequacy of reimbursement rates arose, Medicaid provid-
ers would assert a § 1983 action for violations of either § 30(A) or the
Boren Amendment. 28
23. See generally Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), Guide to
Managed Care: Choosing and Using a Health Plan, at http://www.hiaa.org/con-
sumer/choosing.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (explaining differences between
managed care program and fee for service program and benefits of both pro-
grams). As the HIAA explains: "[i]ndemnity and managed care plans differ in
their basic approach. Put broadly, the major differences concern choice of provid-
ers, out-of-pocket costs for covered services, and how bills are paid." See id. (outlin-
ing health plan choices).
24. See id. (noting that under managed care program beneficiaries will have
lower out-of-pocket costs).
25. See id. (explaining how beneficiary pays for medical services under fee for
service program). For example:
You or they send the bill to the insurance company, which pays part of
it .... You have a deductible . . . to pay each year before the insurer
starts paying. Once you meet the deductible, most indemnity plans pay a
percentage of what they consider the "usual and customary" charge for
covered services.
Id.
26. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 22, at 1 ("Overall, Medicaid enrollment
increased from 28.3 million to 33.2 million between 1991 and 1996, while man-
aged care grew from 9.5 percent to 40.1 percent of total Medicaid enrollment
during the period. Forty-nine states now rely on some form of Medicaid managed
care plan."); see also FAMILIES USA AND HEALTH ASSISTANCE P'SHIP, FIELD REPORT:
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FINAL REGULATIONS ISSUED (Sept. 2002), at http://
www.familiesusa.org/MMCSept2002.pdf (explaining regulations that implement
patient protections for Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care). Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) contract individually with a state's depart-
ment of Public Welfare, and individual pharmacies contract with the HMOs. See
Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 533 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining
how Medicaid managed care is administered in Pennsylvania).
27. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 534 ("The Agreements cover the pro-
vision of brand-name and generic prescription drugs to eligible beneficiaries and
obligate the Department to reimburse the contracting pharmacies in accordance
with state and federal law.").
28. For a discussion of the development of § 1983 actions for violations of
§ 30(A) and the Boren Amendment, see infra notes 52-89 and accompanying text.
2003] CASEBRIEF 1381
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B. Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act: The Equal Access Provision
In asserting a civil rights action under § 1983, Medicaid providers
often utilize the Equal Access provision of the Medicaid Act.29 This provi-
sion has been cited before and after the repeal of the Boren Amend-
ment.31 Prior to the repeal of the Boren Amendment, courts upheld a
provider's right to assert a § 1983 action; after the repeal, courts have de-
clined to uphold such a right. 3 1 In the 1981 Amendment to the Medicaid
Act, Congress altered § 30(A) in a way that de-emphasized provider bene-
fits, but bolstered its emphasis on recipient benefits.3 2 This legislative
change has been cited to show that Congress intended Medicaid recipi-
ents rather than providers to be the intended beneficiaries of the Medi-
caid Act. 33 Unlike the Boren Amendment, § 30(A) does not include
"reasonable cost" language. 34 The Boren Amendment specifically re-
29. See42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A) (2001) (providing Equal Access provision
of Medicaid Act). The text of § 30(A) provides in part:
A state plan for medical assistance must ... provide such methods and
procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and
services available under the plan (including but not limited to utilization
review plans as provided for in section 1396b(i) (4) of this title) as may be
necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and
services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, econ-
omy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so
that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent
that such care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area.
Id.
30. Compare Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1003 (1st
Cir. 1996) (holding Medicaid providers have right to assert § 1983 action for viola-
tions of § 30(A) before repeal of Boren Amendment), Methodist Hosp., Inc. v.
Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996) (same), and Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v.
Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir. 1993) (same), with Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275
F.3d 475, 477-78 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding § 30(A) does not create enforceable
right for purposes of § 1983, after repeal of Boren Amendment), and Evergreen
Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 929 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
31. For a discussion of Medicaid provider rights prior to the repeal of the
Boren Amendment, see infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
32. See Harkins, supra note 19, at 168-72 (explaining intended effects of Boren
Amendment). In the 1981 Amendments to the Medicaid Act, § 30(A) was altered
in two ways: (1) it was removed from the regulations that accompany the Medicaid
Act, and became part of the Medicaid Act itself, and (2) Congress deleted lan-
guage referring to provider costs and provider benefits and added language refer-
ring to Medicaid recipient benefits. See id. (same).
33. See, e.g., Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 541 (3d Cir. 2002)("Nothing in the 1981 amendments suggests that the current version of the statute
is intended to benefit providers.").
34. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1981) (repealed by Balanced Budget
Act of 1997) (providing in relevant part: "A State plan for medical assistance
must . . .provide . . .for payment[s] . . .[that] are reasonable and adequate to
meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
facilities in order to provide care and services"), with 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A)
(2002) (providing in relevant part: "A state plan for medical assistance must ...
assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care
1382 [Vol. 48: p. 1377
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quired that payments to Medicaid providers be reasonable and ade-
quate. 35 Opponents of enforcing a private right under § 30(A) argue that
Congress's omission of reasonable cost language evinced its intent to elim-
inate § 30(A) as an enforceable right.3 6
C. The Boren Amendment and Its Eventual Repeal
In 1980, Congress introduced the Boren Amendment17 to the Medi-
caid Act in response to state concerns that the federal government was
usurping too much power and discretion in administering state Medicaid
programs. 38 The Boren Amendment allowed states to determine on their
own whether their Medicaid program complied with federal regulations
and required states to adopt payment methods and reimbursement rates
that were "reasonable."3 9 This provision of the Medicaid Act focused on
benefiting Medicaid providers, such as participating pharmacists. 40 Ac-
cordingly, courts held that Boren created an enforceable right for provid-
and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available
under the plan .. . to the general population in the geographic area").
35. For a discussion of the Boren Amendment, see infra notes 37-51 and ac-
companying text.
36. See, e.g., Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 929
n.26 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing House reports supporting notion that providers have
no right under § 30(A)).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A) (1981) (repealed in 1997 by Balanced
Budget Act). The Boren Amendment provided in part:
[A] state plan for medical assistance must.., provide.., for payment...
through the use of rates (determined in accordance with the methods
and standards developed by the State . . .) which the State finds, and
makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and eco-
nomically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in
conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and qual-
ity and safety standards ....
Id.
38. See Harkins, supra note 19, at 176 ("The states supported Boren primarily
because they believed that the Amendment gave them discretion to cut payments
without any federal oversight to confirm that their assurances of compliance with
federal law were grounded in objective, verifiable facts and not on speculation.").
39. See id. at 166 (" [T] he legislative history of the reasonable cost related pro-
vision makes explicit Congress' intention that states have freedom both to define
reimbursable costs and to determine the reasonable costs of care, services and
equipment.").
40. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). The Court
held:
[T]he [Boren Amendment to the Medicaid] Act creates a right enforcea-
ble by health care providers under § 1983 to the adoption of reimburse-
ment rates that are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs of an
efficiently and economically operated facility that provides care to Medi-
caid patients. The right is not merely a procedural one that rates be ac-
companied by findings and assurances (however perfunctory) of
reasonableness and adequacy; rather the Act provides a substantive right
to reasonable and adequate rates as well.
7
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ers and allowed providers to challenge the adequacy of reimbursement
rates through a § 1983 action. 41
As a result, courts were faced with a flood of litigation involving the
adequacy of state reimbursement rates.42 States again complained that
there was too much federal oversight of state Medicaid programs and that
states were being forced to spend an "excessive" amount of funding on
Medicaid. 43 These and other factors led to the repeal of the Boren
Amendment.4 4 The Boren Amendment was completely replaced by the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 4 5 The Balanced Budget Act requires that
"states use a public process to set rates. "46 In short, states are no longer
41. See, e.g., Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities v. Fla. Dep't. of Health and Rehab.
Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1216 n.5 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Prior to the repeal of the Boren
Amendment, it was well settled that health care providers under a state Medicaid
program could bring actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and in-
junctive relief to redress ongoing violations of the Amendment.") (citing Tallahas-
see Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693, 704 (11th Cir. 1997)) (allowing
Medicaid provider suit under Boren Amendment); Okla. Nursing Home Ass'n v.
Demps, 792 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (same).
42. See, e.g., Minn. Homecare Ass'n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir.
1997) (challenging Minnesota's "rate setting methodology governing reimburse-
ments for home health care providers under the State's Medicaid program violates
the statutory mandates of the Federal Medicaid Act"); Moody Emergency Med.
Serv. v. Millbrook, 967 F. Supp. 488, 491 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (challenging Millbrook's
method of assigning emergency 911 calls as creating monopoly by one emergency
service provider); Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (chal-
lenging California's methadone maintenance treatment reimbursement scheme);
see also Harkins, supra note 19, at 193 ("Provider suits brought under the Boren
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 13 96a(13), have been a major factor pressuring states to
increase payment rates.... Particularly in recent years, states have been dogged by
provider lawsuits .... ").
43. See Harkins, supra note 19, at 186-94 ("The states sought repeal of Boren
because they wanted the authority to spend more than two hundred billion federal
Medicaid dollars without a concomitant obligation to adhere to any federal stan-
dards when doing so.").
44. See id. (discussing factors leading to repeal of Boren Amendment). Other
factors that led to the repeal of the Boren Amendment included predicted federal
Medicaid savings without the Boren Amendment and the deterioration of fiscal
conditions after September 11, 2001, that required states to cut Medicaid budgets.
See id, at 192-94 (explaining reasons for Boren Amendment repeal).
45. See id. at 195 ("In short, Boren was replaced by a statute that contained no
substantive payment standard and one that did not even require that the state
consider the impact of its rate setting decisions on the ability to deliver quality care
or to comply with state and federal care standards.").
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(13) (2002). The new text of § 13(A) of the Medicaid
Act provides in part:
A state plan for medical assistance must . . . provide (A) for a public
process for determination of rates of payment under the plan for hospital
services, nursing facility services, and services of intermediate care facili-
ties for the mentally retarded under which-
(i) proposed rates, the methodologies underlying the establishment
of such rates, and justifications for the proposed rates are published,
(ii) providers, beneficiaries and their representatives, and other con-
cerned State residents are given a reasonable opportunity for review and
comment on the proposed rates, methodologies, and justifications,
1384 [Vol. 48: p. 1377
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required to meet the federal reasonableness standard with regard to reim-
bursement rates. 47 Medicaid providers did not experience the full effect
of the repeal until the economy began to decline in late 2001.48
In response to poor economic conditions, state Medicaid directors
began cutting back Medicaid budgets. 49 In order to avoid reducing bene-
fits to Medicaid recipients, Medicaid providers were the first target, and
states began to reduce provider reimbursement rates.50 Some providers
were receiving below cost reimbursement rates, and, with the repeal of the
Boren Amendment, it remained unclear whether providers would have
standing to challenge the adequacy of these rates under other provisions
of the Medicaid Act in a § 1983 action. 51
D. Pharmacists' Remedies Under Section 30(A): Section 1983 and the Intended
Beneficiary Requirement
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for "the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 52
(iii) final rates, the methodologies underlying the establishment of
such rates, and justifications for such final rates are published, and
(iv) in the case of hospitals, such rates take into account (in a man-
ner consistent with section 1923) the situation of hospitals which serve a
disproportionate number of low-income patients with special needs ....
Id.
47. See Mark H. Gallant, Balanced Budget Act of 1997: Amendments to Medicaid
Reimbursement Provisions, Boren Amendment Repeal, 2 HEALTH L. PRAc. GUIDE § 21:24
(2002) ("[T]he Boren repeal eliminated the states' obligation to render findings
and make assurances to the Secretary concerning the reasonableness and ade-
quacy of rates to cover the costs incurred ... in favor of a 'rate of payment' estab-
lished pursuant to a loosely defined 'public process."').
48. See Harkins, supra note 19, at 196 (noting that "the economic expansion
the United States enjoyed through the 1990s blunted the immediate fiscal impact
of the repeal").
49. See id. at 160 n.1 (stating between 1995 and 2000, Medicaid expenditures
grew, but by beginning of 2001, fiscal year states began cutbacks in Medicaid ex-
penditures) (citing J. GUYER, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., POLICY BRIEF: THE
ROLE OF MEDICAID IN STATE BUDGETS (Oct. 2001)).
50. See HEALTH MGMT. Assoc., MEDICAID BUDGETS UNDER STRESS: SURVEY FIND-
INGS FOR STATE FISCAL YEAR 2000, 2001 AND 2002 (Oct. 2001) (reporting that "in
2001 roughly one third of states adopted or proposed freezes or actual reductions
in provider payments").
51. But see generally Harkins, supra note 19, at 213-27 (arguing that after repeal
of Boren Amendment, Medicaid providers still have viable cause of action under
§ 30(A) of Medicaid Act).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002). The full text of the statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
9
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Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1983 narrowly and imposed a
strict "implied right of action" standing requirement. 53 In applying this
test, the Supreme Court specified that a statute must be "phrased in terms
of the persons benefited."
54
Starting in the 1980s, courts interpreted the implied right of action
doctrine more expansively. 55 One such expansion occurred when the Su-
preme Court declared that a cause of action under § 1983 enforced not
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Co-
lumbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
53. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688-89 (1979) (applying
implied right of action test to determine whether student had enforceable right
under Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975) (applying multi-factored test to determine whether private remedy is im-
plicit in statute). Under this test, the Court looked to four factors to determine
whether a private remedy is "implicit" in a statute not expressly providing one. See
id. at 78-85 (finding no implied right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610 for share-
holders derivative action). These factors included:
[1] Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted... ?; [2] is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?; [3] is it consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff?; [4] is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law ... so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause
of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
Under the first factor, the Court concluded that looking at the legislative pur-
pose of the statute, it was not intended to benefit shareholders, rather, "corpora-
tions as a source of aggregated wealth" were the intended beneficiaries. See id. at
82 (noting that Court has implied right of action where "there has generally been
a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff . . . or a pervasive legislative
scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the defendant
class in a particular regard"). Under the second factor, the Court found that the
legislative history demonstrates no intent to "vest in corporate shareholders a fed-
eral right to damages for violation of § 610." Id. The Court next held under the
third factor that "the remedy sought would not aid the primary congressional
goal." Id. at 84. Finally, under the fourth factor, the Court determined that state
remedies were adequate and state law should govern. See id. ("[I]t is entirely ap-
propriate ... to relegate respondent and others in his situation to whatever rem-
edy is created by state law.").
54. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 692 n.13 (noting that "right- or duty-creating lan-
guage of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propri-
ety of implication of a cause of action"). Moreover, an implied right of action
must "manifest an intent to create not just a private right but also a private rem-
edy." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (stating that without
statutory intent "a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the
statute").
55. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103,
113 (1989) (referring to "broad remedial scope of § 1983"); Maine v. Thiboutout,
448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (broadly construing phrase "and laws" as used in § 1983).
1386 [Vol. 48: p. 1377
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 5 [2003], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss5/5
2003] CASEBRIEF 1387
only constitutional rights, but also federal statutory rights. 56 The Supreme
Court noted two exceptions to this rule, stating that no cause of action will
exist: (1) where a statute does not create an "enforceable right" or (2)
where Congress has "foreclosed" enforcement of the statute.57
In determining whether a particular statute creates an enforceable
right, courts have applied a three-prong test.58 First, courts ask whether
the putative plaintiff is the intended beneficiary of the statutory provi-
sion. 59 Second, courts determine whether the statute creates a "binding
obligation," or more than "merely a 'congressional preference.' 60 Third,
courts ensure that the provision is not "too vague or amorphous" to
enforce.6 1
56. See Thiboutout, 448 U.S. at 4 ("[T]he § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses
violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law."). Prior to this holding,
plaintiffs could only assert § 1983 claims of constitutional violations, and addi-
tional federal statutory claims were only available as pendant actions. See id. (re-
versing prior cases). But see Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 27-28 (1981) (applying rationale in Thiboutout, but finding no enforceable
right under Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act).
57. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423
(1987) (stating that "if there is a state deprivation of a 'right' secured by a federal
statute, § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demon-
strates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that
Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement"); see also Pennhurst, 451
U.S. at 19 (suggesting § 1983 right is foreclosed because statutory language is am-
biguous and does not support rights and obligations "read into it" by lower court);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21
(1981) (stating that Congress's remedial scheme inserted into statute foreclosed
availability of privately enforceable right under § 1983).
58. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990) (holding that Bo-
ren Amendment to Medicaid Act creates enforceable right under three-prong
analysis); Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (holding National Labor Relations Act cre-
ated enforceable right for employers to assert § 1983 action against government
interference). But see Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 338 (1997) (finding Title
IV-D of Social Security Act does not give individuals federally enforceable right
under § 1983 using three-prong analysis).
59. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 430 (finding that Brooke Amendment to Housing
Act intended to benefit tenants and therefore created enforceable right under
§ 1983); see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 (finding health care providers are intended
beneficiaries of Boren Amendment because "provision establishes a system for re-
imbursement of providers and is phrased in terms benefiting health care
providers").
60. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19 (finding that Act "does no more than express a
congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment. It is simply a general state-
ment of 'findings"'). But see Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512 ("The Boren Amendment's
language succinctly sets forth a congressional command, which is wholly un-
characteristic of a mere suggestion or 'nudge."').
61. See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 112 (allowing federally enforceable right and
concluding that "the violation of a federal right that has been found to be implicit
in a statute's language and structure is as much a 'direct violation' of a right as is
the violation of a right that is clearly set forth in the text of the statute"); Wright,
479 U.S. at 430 (rejecting vague and amorphous argument and finding that "the
benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and defi-
11
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In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n,62 the Supreme Court applied the
§ 1983 three-prong test in an action challenging the administration of Vir-
ginia's Medicaid program under the Boren Amendment. 63 The issue in
Wilder was whether a health care provider could bring an action under
§ 1983 to challenge state reimbursement rates under the Boren Amend-
ment.64 In determining whether the Boren Amendment created an en-
forceable right, the Court first looked to its legislative history and
concluded that health care providers are the intended beneficiaries of the
Boren Amendment.6 5 Further, because the Boren Amendment is set
forth in "mandatory terms," the Court concluded that Boren imposed a
binding obligation on states participating in Medicaid to adopt "adequate
and reasonable rates."66 After Wilder, courts continued to apply the three-
prong test, but later cases hinted at a return to a stricter standard. 67
III. OTHER CIRCUITS' POSITIONS ON PHARMACIST STANDING TO ASSERT A
§ 1983 ACTION: BEFORE AND AFTER THE REPEAL OF THE
BOREN AMENDMENT
Other circuit courts have disparate holdings on whether Medicaid
providers have standing to assert § 1983 actions for violations of § 30(A).68
Looking at circuit court decisions chronologically, the cases may be cate-
gorized into two groups: (1) decisions before the repeal of the Boren
Amendment and (2) decisions after the repeal that illustrate the effects of
Boren's repeal on § 1983 standing.6 9 The Third Circuit case law on the
nite to qualify as enforceable rights under... § 1983, rights that are not, as respon-
dent suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce").
62. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
63. See id. at 508-20 (finding that Boren Amendment creates enforceable right
and Congress did not foreclose enforcement of Act under § 1983).
64. See id. at 503 (arguing Virginia's plan for reimbursement violates Medi-
caid Act "because the rates are not reasonable and adequate to meet the economi-
cally and efficiently incurred cost of providing care to Medicaid patients in
hospitals and do not assure access to inpatient care").
65. See id. at 506 (discussing legislative purpose behind enacting Boren
Amendment); see also H.R. REP. No. 97-158, Vol. II, at 293 (1981) (noting that
Congress "recognize[d] the inflationary nature of the [then] current cost reim-
bursement system and intend[ed] to give States greater latitude in developing and
implementing alternative reimbursement methodologies that promote the effi-
cient and economical delivery of such services").
66. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 514 (declining to "adopt an interpretation of the Boren
Amendment that would render it a dead letter").
67. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (applying im-
plied right of action standard for determining whether statutory provision creates
enforceable right); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 356 (1992) (noting importance
of rights creating language). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's most recent
decision on the heightened § 1983 standard in Gonzaga University v. Doe, see infra
notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
68. For a discussion of other circuits' holdings, see infra notes 71-86 and ac-
companying text.
69. For a discussion of other circuit courts' holdings before the repeal of the
Boren amendment, see infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. For a discussion
1388 [Vol. 48: p. 1377
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issue prior to Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n is consistent with the majority
of the other circuits.
70
A. Decisions Before the Repeal of the Boren Amendment: Medicaid Providers
Have Standing Under § 1983
Initially, courts enforced a private right of action under § 1983 for
violations of § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act, likening the Supreme Court's
rationale in Wilder to cases involving § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act.7 ' All of
the circuits that addressed this issue prior to the repeal of the Boren
Amendment granted a private right of action under § 1983 for violations
of § 30(A). 72 The First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits proposed similar ar-
guments when holding that § 30(A) creates an enforceable right.73
Courts drew similarities between the language in the Boren Amend-
ment and § 30(A), concluding that Medicaid providers are the intended
beneficiaries of both provisions.7 4 One court determined the Boren
Amendment and § 30(A) contained nearly identical "substantive require-
on other circuit courts' holdings after the repeal of the Boren Amendment, see
infra notes 80-86.
70. For a discussion of other Third Circuit case law on provider standing, see
infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1003 (1st
Cir. 1996) (noting that every circuit that has addressed issue has found that "the
Wilder rationale likewise applies to the second 'equal access' right described in
section 1396(a)(30) . . .health care providers [are] intended beneficiaries under
both the Boren Amendment and section 1396(a) (30) since health care providers,
as payees, obviously are affected by substantive changes in state reimbursement
schemes").
72. See id. at 1003-04 (holding that Medicaid providers are intended benefi-
ciaries of § 30(A)); Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir.
1996) (same); Ark. Med. Soc'y Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir. 1993)
(same).
73. For a discussion of arguments advanced by other circuits in support of
Medicaid provider standing before the repeal of the Boren Amendment, see infra
notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
74. See Minn. Homecare Ass'n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 919 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Cohen, J., concurring) ("Like the Boren Amendment, section 1396(a) (30) 're-
quires each state to produce a result, not to employ any particular methodology for
getting there."' (emphasis in original)); see also Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 93 F.3d at 1004
(explaining that Wilder also stands for general proposition that health care provid-
ers are intended beneficiaries of Medicaid Act); Methodist Hosp., 91 F.3d at 1029-30
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding Wilder decision binding on court because of similarity
between Boren Amendment and § 30(A)); Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc., 6 F.3d at 525
("[T]he equal access provision is very analogous to the Boren Amendment ex-
amined in Wilder, they are similar not only in function but also in the specific
language employed."); Moody Emergency Med. Serv. v. Millbrook, 967 F. Supp.
488, 494 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (noting that because Medicaid providers are intended
beneficiaries of Boren Amendment, they are likewise beneficiaries of equal access
provision); Ill. Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (not-
ing that equal access provision complements Boren Amendment; therefore, it
should also be enforceable right).
13
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ments" to determine reimbursement to providers. 75 Additionally, some
courts interpreted the Medicaid Act as having more than one intended
beneficiary.
76
Further, courts pointed to the legislative history of § 30(A) to support
their position that Congress intended § 30(A) to be judicially enforced. 77
Courts determined that when Congress moved § 30(A) from the regula-
tions to the Medicaid Act itself, it intended to confer a right on the Act's
beneficiaries. 78 Moreover, one court noted that, prior to § 30(A)'s inclu-
sion in the Medicaid Act, it was "inadequately enforced. '79
B. Decisions After the Repeal of the Boren Amendment: Medicaid Providers Do
Not Have Standing Under § 1983
After the repeal of the Boren Amendment, courts slowly began to
hold that Medicaid providers no longer had standing under § 1983 for
violations of § 30(A).8 0 While the Fifth and Third Circuits are the only
75. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 93 F.3d at 1005 (noting that § 30(A) and Boren
Amendment do not create "vague or amorphous" standard for judicial enforce-
ment). The Eighth Circuit similarly reasoned that the Boren Amendment and
§ 30(A) are "similar not only in function but also in the language employed." Ark.
Med. Soc'y, Inc., 6 F.3d at 525 (looking carefully at specific sections of Medicaid Act
in light of court's past decisions).
76. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 93 F.3d at 1004 n.7 (" [1] t is well settled that
Congress may create more than one class of intended beneficiary."); see also Pa.
Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 544 (3d Cir. 2002) (Becker, J., dis-
senting) ("[A] statute can have more than one class of intended beneficiaries and
hence the mere fact that Congress intended § 30(A) to benefit Medicaid recipients
has no bearing on whether Congress also intended § 30(A) to benefit Medicaid
providers.").
77. See Ark. Med. Socy, Inc., 6 F.3d at 526 (discussing legislative history of equal
access provision).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 390 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2060, 2115-16 (providing legislative history). The House report provides:
The Committee Bill would codify, with one clarification, the current reg-
ulation, 42 C.F.R. 447.204, requiring adequate payment levels. Specifi-
cally, the Committee bill would require that Medicaid payments for all
practitioners be sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and ser-
vices are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and
services are available to the general population in the geographic area.
Id.
79. See Ark. Med. Socy, Inc., 6 F.3d at 526 (discussing motivations for codifying
equal access provision). District courts in other circuits have also adopted this
"inadequate enforcement" rationale as "compelling" evidence that the equal ac-
cess provision is subject to judicial enforceability. See, e.g., Moody Emergency Med.
Serv. Inc., 967 F. Supp. at 495 n.8 (noting that legislative history demonstrates con-
gressional intent to give equal access provision "appropriate enforcement").
80. See Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying
pharmacy, as Medicaid provider, standing to assert § 1983 action for violations of
§ 30(A)); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 931-32
(5th Cir. 2000) (same); Burlington United Methodist Family Servs., Inc. v. Atkins,
227 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596-97 (S.D. W.Va. 2002) (following Supreme Court's height-
ened standard in Gonzaga, stating Medicaid providers have no standing to assert
§ 1983 action for violations of § 30(A)); Fla. Pharmacy Ass'n v. Cook, 17 F. Supp.
1390
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circuits that have heard this issue since the repeal of the Boren Amend-
ment, both have concluded that without the Boren Amendment, Medicaid
providers lack standing.8 ' Courts, therefore, can no longer rely on Wilder
as their primary authority and are left without a strong basis for finding
that § 30(A) is an enforceable right for Medicaid providers. 82
Absent reliance on the Boren Amendment, courts determined that
Medicaid providers were not the intended beneficiaries of § 30(A) by not-
ing that § 30(A)'s reference to "payment" to providers is not enough to
call providers intended beneficiaries. 83 The Fifth Circuit stated that the
Equal Access provision is not directed to Medicaid providers but rather to
recipients, commenting that the benefit to providers is "indirect at best."
8 4
Accordingly, an indirect benefit to providers is not sufficient to meet the
intended beneficiary requirement. 8 5 Additionally, some courts pointed
2d 1293, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 1998) (distinguishing § 30(A) from Boren Amendment
and finding no enforceable right under § 30(A)). But see Am. Soc'y of Consultant
Pharmacists v. Concannon, 214 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29-30 (D. Me. 2002) (upholding
First Circuit's holding that Medicaid providers do have standing to assert § 1983
actions under § 30(A), but calling into doubt First Circuit's holding in light of
decision in Gonzaga); Am. Soc'y of Consultant Pharmacists v. Garner, 180 F. Supp.
2d 953, 971 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (noting that Seventh Circuit's decision is still viable,
and repeal of Boren does not necessarily lead to conclusion that there is no longer
standing under § 30(A)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Knickerman, 101 F. Supp. 2d
749, 752 (E.D. Ark. 2000) (upholding Eighth Circuit's conferral of standing to
Medicaid providers).
81. See, e.g., Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 541-42 (determining that Medi-
caid providers are not intended beneficiaries of § 30(A), therefore, they have no
standing under § 1983); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, 235 F.3d at 931-32 (same).
82. Cf Health Care Law-Medicaid-Third Circuit Finds Providers Lack Standing
to Enforce the Medicaid Act, 116 HARv. L. REV. 969, 975-76 (2003) (suggesting that
Wilder has little remaining vitality after Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga and
Boren repeal).
83. See Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, 235 F.3d at 928 (discussing whether
providers are intended beneficiaries).
[I]n contrast to the Boren Amendment, section 30(A) does not create an
"individual entitlement" for individual providers to a particular level of
payment because it does not directly address those providers. Instead,
section 30(A) speaks directly to individual recipients, conferring upon
them an "individual entitlement" to equal access to medical care.
Id.
84. See id. at 929 ("The statute does not confer any direct right upon the indi-
vidual provider because .... even if an individual provider is forced to liquidate,
the recipients' right to access is not necessarily violated."). Another district court
reasoned that the intended beneficiaries of § 30(A) include "federal and state gov-
ernments who fund the Medicaid program, taxpayers who ultimately bear the fi-
nancial burden, and patients." Fa. Pharmacy Ass'n, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1300 (finding
that "requirement for 'efficiency, economy and quality of care' is not intended to
benefit pharmacies"). Even if the goals of Medicaid are "important" to providers,
they are not the intended beneficiaries within the meaning of the three-prong test.
See id. (explaining why providers have no enforceable right under § 30(A)).
85. Some district courts have declined to deny standing to Medicaid providers
in response to the repeal of the Boren Amendment. See, e.g., Concannon, 214 F.
Supp. 2d at 30 ("At present, Section 30(A) creates a right in Medicaid service prov-
iders to rates of reimbursement that are consistent with the goals of economy,
15
Nisse: Pharmacists without Remedies Means Serious Side Effects for Patie
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
1392 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48: p. 1377
specifically to the repeal of the Boren Amendment as an indication that
Congress no longer intended Medicaid providers to have the right to chal-
lenge § 30(A) in a § 1983 action.86
C. Third Circuit Precedent: Medicaid Provider Standing Before Pennsylvania
Pharmacists Ass'n
Prior to the court's holding in Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n, the
Third Circuit had not developed significant case law on Medicaid provider
standing for violations of § 30(A). 87 This issue was mentioned once in a
footnote of an opinion that rejected the argument that Medicaid provid-
efficiency, quality of care, and equal access, enforceable via section 1983 actions.");
Garner, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 972 ("We decline the defendant's invitation to disregard
the clear holding of Methodist Hospitals, and we thus conclude that plaintiffs have a
right to pursue this claim under section 30(A)."). The District Court of Illinois
commented that the Boren Amendment repeal "does not inevitably lead to the
conclusion that Congress intended to eliminate that right in actions under Section
30(A) because presumably Congress knew that a provider right of action was rec-
ognized tinder section 30(A), but declined to override those precedents." Id. at
971 (offering argument that repeal of Boren is not fatal to asserting § 1983 actions
for violations of 30(A)); see generally Harkins, supra note 19, at 199-203 ("Oppo-
nents of the Boren Amendment who believed that the repeal would leave the states
with almost unfettered discretion to set payment rates failed to recognize that the
Act contained other provisions governing the calculation, and amount, of Medi-
caid payment."). The author also suggests:
[T] he legislative history of the Boren repeal states that the Committee
contemplated that the Act would not support a cause of action to chal-
lenge the adequacy tinder federal law of a state's Medicaid payment rates.
Unfortunately for the states, the Committee's language is years too late
and far too little to prevent enforcement of [§ 30(A)].
Id. at 203.
Other district courts have granted standing to Medicaid providers simply be-
cause they are bound by their respective circuit's decisions on the issue. See, e.g.,
Concannon, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (upholding First Circuit's decision that Medi-
caid providers have standing to assert § 1983 actions under § 30(A), but calling
into doubt First Circuit's holding in light of decision in Gonzaga); Garner, 180 F.
Supp. 2d at 972 (upholding Seventh Circuit's action under § 30(A)); Wal-Mart
Stores, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (upholding Eighth Circuit's decision).
86. See Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, 235 F.3d at 929 n.26 ("[O]ur conclu-
sion that providers are not intended beneficiaries of section 30(A) is consistent
with Congress' concern in its repeal of the Boren Amendment to preclude further
lawstits by providers to contest the adequacy of their reimbursement rates."); Bur-
lington United Methodist Family Set-vs., Inc. v. Atkins, 227 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 n.3
(S.D. W. Va. 2002) ("Congress' concern in repeal of the Boren Amendment is
consistent with the conclusion, based on statutory analysis, that § 30(A) is not in-
tended to benefit providers."). One court noted, "[w]ith the repeal of the Boren
Amendment nothing remains that remotely resembles a federal right to reasona-
ble and adequate rates." HCMF v. Gilmore, 26 F. Supp. 2d 873, 880 (W.D. Va.
1998) (explaining impact of repeal of Boren Amendment).
87. See, e.g., Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 850-51 (3d Cir.
1999) (assuming that Medicaid providers had standing to assert § 1983 action and
addressing merits of § 30(A) violation), superceded by Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Hous-
toun, 283 F.3d 531 (3d Cir. 2002), cel. denied, 123 S.Ct. 100 (2002).
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ers do not have "a private cause of action" under § 30(A). 88 Considering
Medicaid providers previously had a right to sue for violations of the Bo-
ren Amendment, one can infer that prior to Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n,
Medicaid providers had standing to sue for violations of § 30(A) in the
Third Circuit.89
TV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN PENNSYLVANIA
PHARMACISTS Ass 'N
This section details the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n. In this six to five decision, Judge
Alito wrote the majority opinion and was joined by five other judges.9 °
Chief Judge Becker wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by four
other judges.91 Additionally, Judge Rendell wrote a dissenting opinion
that was joined by Chief Judge Becker. 9 2
A. Facts and Procedural Background
In 1997, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (hereinafter
PA Department) implemented a mandatory managed care program,
"HealthChoices," to provide health care for needy Pennsylvania citizens
covered by Medicaid.9 3 In January 1999, a group of sixteen Pennsylvania
pharmacists and the Pennsylvania Pharmacists Association brought a class
action against the PA Department under § 1983 for violations of § 30(A)
88. See Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 850 n.7 (rejecting Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare's argument that pharmacists may not sue to enforce § 30(A)); see
also Rite Aid of Pa. v. Houstoun, 998 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (explain-
ing that pharmacists had standing under § 1983).
89. For further discussion of Medicaid providers' right to sue under the Bo-
ren Amendment, see supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
90. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 531 (3d Cir. 2002)
(stating that Judge Alito wrote majority opinion joined by Judges Nygaard, Roth,
Barry, Ambro and Fuentes).
91. See id. (stating thatJudge Becker wrote main dissenting opinion joined by
Judges Mansmann, Scirica, McKee and Rendell).
92. See id. (stating that Judge Rendell also wrote separate dissenting opinion
joined by ChiefJudge Becker). For purposes of this section, the text will focus on
Chief Judge Becker's dissenting opinion, unless specifically referring to Judge
Rendell's separate opinion.
93. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 533 (noting that under prior fee for
service program pharmacies were reimbursed for brand-name drugs based on "'es-
timated acquisition cost' of the drugs plus a 'reasonable' dispensing fee"). Under
HealthChoices, pharmacists entered into "Medical Assistance Provider Agree-
ments" with the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (PA Department),
which covered brand name and generic prescription drugs that were eligible to
Medicaid recipients, and also covered the rate at which pharmacies would be reim-
bursed for the cost of these drugs. See id. at 533-34 (noting that Pennsylvania
agreed to participate in mandatory managed care pursuant to waiver from certain
provisions of Medicaid Act). The court noted that the "waiver applies to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(1) (statewide scope), § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (comparability of services),
and § 1396a(a) (23) (freedom of choice)." Id. at 533 n.3.
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of the Medicaid Act.94 The pharmacists alleged that the new reimburse-
ment rates to pharmacies for prescription drug coverage were below the
cost of acquiring and dispensing the drugs.9 5
The district court certified the class of pharmacists and denied the PA
Department's motion to dismiss, holding that the pharmacists had stand-
ing under § 1983.96 Additionally, the district court granted the PA De-
partment's motion for summary judgment, finding that the Department's
determination of the reimbursement rates did not violate § 30(A). 97 The
pharmacists appealed to the Third Circuit, but before the panel issued its
decision, the court granted a rehearing en banc because other circuits
were split on the issue of Medicaid provider standing under § 30(A). 98 In
an en banc panel of eleven judges, the Third Circuit held that the pharma-
cists did not have a private right to enforce § 30(A) and affirmed the dis-
trict court's order in favor of the PA Department.99
B. Majority Opinion
The Third Circuit first determined that § 1983 requires plaintiffs to
be the intended beneficiaries of the federal statute, regardless of whether
the statute "in fact" benefits them.10 0 The court acknowledged that
§ 30(A) in fact benefits pharmacies in some states by increasing drug sales,
which then has a "ripple effect," benefiting other businesses such as drug
manufacturers and drug wholesalers. 10 ' Nonetheless, the court con-
cluded that it was not Congress's intent to create an enforceable federal
right for all entities who are in fact benefited by § 30(A). 10 2
In determining that § 30(A) was not intended to benefit Medicaid
providers, the court returned to the implied right of action test from early
94. See id. at 534 (explaining procedural posture of case).
95. See id. (pointing to pharmacy benefits managers who, "without oversight
from Department, had decreased the outpatient pharmacy benefit rates").
96. See id. (quoting Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, No. CIV.A.99-491,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23011 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999)).
97. Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, No. CIV.A.99-491, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7807, at *3-5 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2000) (granting summary judgment on mer-
its of § 30(A) claim).
98. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 534 (explaining how case arrived at
eleven judge en banc panel).
99. See id. at 541-42 (holding in 6-5 decision that Medicaid providers are not
intended beneficiaries of the Medicaid Act).
100. See id. at 535-36 (noting distinction between "intended to benefit" and
"in fact benefits").
101. See id. at 536 (illustrating why "in fact" beneficiaries have no enforceable
right to assert § 1983 actions).
102. See id. ("[I]t would be outlandish to argue that the Wilder/Blessing in-
tended-to-benefit requirement permits all of these businesses and individuals to
assert § 30(A) claims in federal court.").
1394 [Vol. 48: p. 1377
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§ 1983 jurisprudence. 10 3 The court reiterated the importance of looking
at the language of the statute itself, scrutinizing the way in which the statu-
tory provision is framed and determining whether there is any "right- or
duty-creating language" in the statute. 10 4
In an effort to distinguish Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n from the Su-
preme Court's decision in Wilder, the Third Circuit pointed to the "criti-
cal" differences between the Boren Amendment and § 30(A). First, unlike
the Boren Amendment, § 30(A) manifests no direct concern for the eco-
nomic situation of providers. 10 5 Instead § 30(A) is concerned with bene-
fits to recipients. 10 6 Unlike the congressional intent behind the Boren
Amendment, the legislative history of § 30(A) focuses solely on benefiting
Medicaid recipients. '
0 7
The court additionally rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Health
and Human Services (HHS) regulations that accompany the Medicaid Act
evince intent to benefit providers. 10 8 The court discounted this argu-
ment, reasoning that the regulations merely set a ceiling for reimburse-
103. See id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi. and Alexander v. Sandoval). For a
discussion of the implied right of action test under § 1983, see supra notes 53-61
and accompanying text.
104. See Pa. Pharmacists Assn, 283 F.3d at 536 (requiring courts to "pay careful
attention to the way in which the statutory provision at issue is framed"). Using
this reasoning, the court separated the language of § 30(A) into four main compo-
nents: "A state must provide methods and procedures ... [that] assure that pay-
ments to providers produce four outcomes: (1) 'efficiency,' (2) 'economy,' (3)
'quality of care,' and (4) adequate access to providers by Medicaid beneficiaries."
Id. at 537 (looking first at statutory language). The court first dismissed outcomes
(1) and (2) as not intending to benefit providers, but rather assuring that pay-
ments to pharmacists are not too high, thereby benefiting the state. See id. at 538
n.9 (discussing how unprofitability of pharmacy does not make Medicaid program
inefficient and uneconomical). Additionally, it held that outcomes (3) and (4) are
also not intended to benefit Medicaid providers because they have an "'unmistaka-
ble focus on' Medicaid beneficiaries, not providers." See id. at 538 (suggesting that
"[i]f Congress had wanted to look after pharmacies, it would hardly have framed
section 30(A) in the terms it chose"). Further, the language of section 30(A) is
phrased in terms of benefiting Medicaid recipients. See id. (citing Wilder for
support).
105. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 538 ("Section 30(A), unlike the Bo-
ren Amendment, does not demand that payments be set at levels that are sufficient
to cover provider costs.").
106. See id. (noting that dissent disagrees with this proposition, arguing that
Boren and § 30(A) confer "nearly identical rights on providers").
107. See id. at 540-41 (finding nothing in legislative history inconsistent with
court's interpretation of statute). The court noted that in the 1981 Amendments
to § 30(A), Congress removed language concerning providers' reasonable charges
and added language providing further protection for Medicaid recipients. See id.
at 541 ("[T]he effect of the 1981 amendments was to sharpen the focus on Medi-
caid beneficiaries.").
108. See id. (quoting federal regulations that set price ceiling on what provid-
ers must be paid); see also generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.300-.304 (2001) (providing
purpose of regulations, definitions, state plan requirements and tipper limits of
Medicaid reimbursements to Medicaid providers); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.331-.334
(2001) (specifying regulations relating to prescription drugs).
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ment rates, not a floor above which providers must be paid. 109 Moreover,
these regulations protect states from overpaying providers.
110
Finally, the court discussed the significance of the repeal of the Boren
Amendment. I The Third Circuit stated that one of Congress's objec-
tives in repealing the Boren Amendment was to take away Medicaid prov-
iders' right to sue under § 1983.1 12 Accordingly, Congress did not intend
§ 30(A) to create an enforceable right for Medicaid providers, otherwise
§ 30(A) also would have been repealed.' 1 3 The court concluded its analy-
sis by adopting the Fifth Circuit's holding that § 30(A) was not intended to
benefit Medicaid providers and rejected the First, Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuit approaches. 1 14
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent acknowledged that Medicaid recipients are one of the
intended beneficiaries of § 30(A), but emphasized that it was possible that
the statute could have more than one class of intended beneficiaries."
5
Moreover, § 30(A) targets both Medicaid providers and Medicaid recipi-
109. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.331(b) (2001) (requiring that state agency's payment
for drugs not exceed, in aggregate, payment levels determined by Health and
Human Services).
110. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 541 (suggesting that regulation
would allow any payments below ceiling).
111. See id. at 539 (reporting that repeal of Boren Amendment would save
$1.2 billion over four years).
112. See generally Governors' Perspective on Medicaid: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Health and Env't of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 18-23 (1997) (state-
ment of Governors Miller and Leavitt) ("The Boren Amendment and other Boren-
like statutory provisions must be repealed. 'One hundred percent reasonable cost
reimbursement' must be phased out."). For further discussion of the purpose be-
hind the repeal of the Boren Amendment, see supra notes 44-51 and accompany-
ing text.
113. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 540 (noting critical differences be-
tween Boren Amendment and § 30(A)).
114. See id. at 542-44 (discussing other circuit court cases). The majority de-
clined to enter into a policy debate regarding the adequacy of Medicaid provider
reimbursement rates, but criticized the dissent's portrayal of the inadequacy of
pharmacist reimbursement rates in Pennsylvania. See id. at 539 (noting that inclu-
sion of cost-reimbursement language in Boren Amendment was unmistakable sign
of congressional desire to benefit providers). The majority noted that the dissent
relied solely on plaintiffs' evidence about the effect of new rates on access to phar-
macies, even though this evidence is disputed. See id. at 539 n.10 (stating that
district court held that plaintiffs had not shown sufficient evidence that access re-
quirement was not being met). The majority found that the dissent's characteriza-
tion of the "real world of health care" was unconvincing. Id.
115. See id. at 544-45 (Becker, J., dissenting) (explaining possibility of more
than one class of intended beneficiaries). The dissent stressed that the mere fact
that Congress intended § 30(A) to benefit Medicaid recipients did not mean that
Medicaid providers could not also benefit from § 30(A). See id. (explaining simi-
larities between providers and beneficiaries).
[Vol. 48: p. 13771396
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ents by requiring adequate reimbursement for providers and access to
care for recipients." 6
Next, the dissent questioned the majority's return to the heightened
implied right of action test for creating an enforceable right under
§ 1983.117 The dissent argued that the intended beneficiary requirement
does not require a provision to be "drafted with an unmistakable focus on
the benefited class."' 1 8 Rather, the dissent suggested a looser standard for
determining whether a statute creates an enforceable right under
§ 1983.119
In applying Wilder, the dissent advocated that § 30(A) and the Boren
Amendment confer "nearly identical rights" on Medicaid providers. 120
Looking at the language of both provisions, the dissent claimed that the
text of § 30(A) is "strikingly similar" to the Boren Amendment because
both require states to reimburse providers for services rendered and both
require states to reimburse providers at rates that are sufficient to ensure
quality of care. 12 1 Additionally, the dissent emphasized the similarity of
the two "quality of care" provisions found in § 30(A) and the Boren
Amendment as further evidence that § 30(A) creates an enforceable
right. 122
116. See id. at 546 (Becker, J., dissenting) (finding § 30(A) "expressly requires
states to establish a scheme for provider reimbursement and mandates minimum
reimbursement rates defined by reference to recipients' quality of care and access
to care and services"). Additionally, in looking at the plain language of § 30(A), in
a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Rendell also suggested that there can be two
classes of intended beneficiaries: if the statute is designed to "benefit one (the
providers) in order to provide the desired level of services to the other (the recipi-
ents)." Id. at 561 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (focusing on statutory language).
117. See id. at 548 n.1 (Becker, J., dissenting) (arguing that § 1983 only re-
quires showing that provision intended to benefit plaintiff instead of returning to
stricter implied right of action cases).
118. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (distinguishing intended to benefit re-
quirement from implied right of action inquiry).
119. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City
of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)) ("[I]n the § 1983 context, a plaintiff
must simply show that the provision in question was 'intended to benefit' the
plaintiff.").
120. See id. at 550 (Becker, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Wilder is appropri-
ate standard).
121. See id. at 549 (Becker, J., dissenting) ("I can find no principled basis for
holding that providers are intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment ...
but are not intended beneficiaries of section 30(A) as the majority holds today.").
122. See id. (comparing Boren Amendment provisions on quality of care to
section 30(A) provision on same). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(13) (1981) (re-
pealed in 1997) (noting that reimbursement rates must be "reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs which must be incurred ... in order to provide care and
services in conformity with ... quality and safety standards"), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(30) (A) (2002) (noting that states must "assure that payments are . . .
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under
the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the gen-
eral population in the geographic area"). The dissent argued that the Boren
Amendment did not create an individual right to pursue a § 1983 action as part of
21
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Finally, the dissent contended that the majority opinion was flawed
from a policy standpoint in that it ignored the "dynamic of the real world
of health care."1 23 The dissent argued that on a practical level HMOs set
provider reimbursement rates too low. 124 If Medicaid providers are una-
ble to challenge the adequacy of these reimbursement rates through a
§ 1983 action, providers will simply refuse to render services to recipients
and Medicaid recipients will ultimately suffer from reduced access to
Medicaid providers. 125 Further, the dissent provided data that suggested
that provider pharmacies have already started dropping out of the Medi-
caid program.
126
Although the majority held that Medicaid recipients have an enforcea-
ble right under § 30(A) and can sue under § 1983, the dissent noted that
Medicaid recipients are ill-equipped for such lawsuits and Medicaid prov-
iders are in a better position to vindicate both recipient and provider
rights. 12 7 Financially, Medicaid recipients are extremely limited in their
Boren's "cost reimbursement" provision; rather the court's holding is dependent
upon its interpretation of the quality of care provision. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n,
283 F.3d at 551 (Becker, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "the reference to provid-
ers' costs in the Boren Amendment and the absence of such a reference in Section
30(A) are immaterial for purposes of determining whether providers are among
the intended beneficiaries of Section 30(A)"). The dissent next argued that the
majority misinterpreted Wilder's determination as to which specific Boren Amend-
ment language was "phrased in terms of benefiting providers." See id. (Becker, J.,
dissenting) (explaining different interpretations of Wilder). The dissent con-
tended that Wilders holding relied on the portion of the Boren Amendment that
required a state plan to "provide for payment of the hospital services" rather than
Boren's requirement that states "establish a scheme to reimburse providers for
services rendered." See id. at 553 n.3 (Becker, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority
mischaracterized statutory interpretation as redundant). Under the dissent's inter-
pretation of Wilder, § 30(A) similarly is phrased in terms of benefiting providers
because it requires "a state plan to provide for payment for [ care and services
available under the plan." See id. at 555 (quoting § 30(A)).
123. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 545 (Becker, J., dissenting) (noting
that majority failed to put case in context of health care crisis).
124. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) ("The plaintiffs have adduced evidence
designed to demonstrate that the HMOs, in administering Medicaid, have
squeezed the pharmacies and reduced provider reimbursement rates to levels that,
according to the plaintiffs, are below any reasonable measure of the cost of provid-
ing care and services.").
125. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (arguing that providers withdrawing from
Medicaid is a natural consequence of majority's decision).
126. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) ("[Fifty percent] of the pharmacies that
participated in Medicaid in the five county area have dropped out since 1997 ...
no pharmacy within fifteen contiguous zip codes in Bucks and Montgomery coun-
ties participates in Medicaid."). The data further suggested that of those pharma-
cies that remain, quality of care has suffered. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting)
(" [A] mong those pharmacies in the five-county area that continue to participate in
Medicaid, quality of care has suffered as a result of inadequate reimbursement
rates.").
127. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (providing reasons why Medicaid providers
are in better position to bring suits for violations of § 30(A)).
1398
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ability to afford and to access legal services. 128 Providers have easier access
to information about reimbursement rates and to statistical data about the
availability of health care to the general public. 129 Accordingly, Medicaid
providers are in a better position to challenge provider reimbursement
rates under § 30(A).
D. Critical Analysis of the Majority Opinion: Adverse Implications for
Medicaid Recipients
Based on the repeal of the Boren Amendment, the majority properly
followed the law in denying Medicaid providers standing to challenge
Medicaid reimbursement rates. The majority's decision, however, has ad-
verse public policy implications. Congressional reports indicate that one
of the motivating factors behind the repeal of the Boren Amendment was
to preclude Medicaid provider § 1983 actions. 13 0 Although the Third Cir-
cuit's holding contravenes three other circuits' decisions, these three deci-
sions were issued before the repeal of the Boren Amendment. 1
31
Therefore, the significance of Boren's repeal is clear: without the Amend-
ment, Medicaid providers have no cause of action. 132 Additionally, by
looking at the recent Supreme Court precedent on § 1983 actions, the
Third Circuit properly anticipated a heightened intended beneficiary re-
quirement. 133 Three months after the Third Circuit's decision, the Su-
128. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (focusing on financial constraints of Medi-
caid recipients). But see id. at 559 n.5 (Becker, J., dissenting) (noting that attor-
neys' fees are available to successful § 1983 claimant).
129. See id. at 559-60 (Becker, J., dissenting) (noting that "professional as-
sociations such as the pharmacists association plaintiff in this case are more likely
to possess the market data necessary to determine whether a colorable claim under
§ 30(A) exists").
130. For a discussion of the purpose behind the repeal of the Boren Amend-
ment, see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
131. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1004-05 (1st
Cir. 1996) (finding standing based on analogy to Boren Amendment); Methodist
Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Ark. Med. Soc'y,
Inc., v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir. 1993) (same).
132. But see Harkins, supra note 19, at 217-27 (suggesting that even after re-
peal of Boren, providers can still enforce other provisions of Medicaid Act, includ-
ing § 30(A)).
133. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002) (quoting
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)) (suggesting that "initial in-
quiry-determining whether a statute confers any right at all-is no different from
the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case, the express purpose of which
is to determine whether or not a statute 'confer[s] rights on a particular class of
persons"'). The Court in Gonzaga also stated that recent decisions have rejected
attempts to infer "enforceable rights" from Spending Clause statutes. Id. at 281; see
also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (looking for "rights-creating"
language as set forth in implied right of action cases); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S.
347, 357 (1992) (questioning whether Adoption Act "unambiguously confer[s]"
rights upon child beneficiaries of Act).
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preme Court held that in order to bring an action under § 1983, there
must be evidence of a violation of an "unambiguously conferred right."1 3 4
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, a former university student sued the
school under § 1983 for violations of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA). 135 The Court held that the student did not have
standing to sue under § 1983 because the challenged provision of FERPA
did not contain any "rights-creating language." 13 6 The Court's holding
indicates that the Third Circuit's strict interpretation of the intended
beneficiary requirement properly anticipated a trend in § 1983
jurisprudence. 137
The Third Circuit's decision indirectly undercuts some of the policy
objectives behind Medicaid. Congress's main objective in developing
Medicaid was to provide access to health care services for the neediest
Americans.1-8 Pharmacies have a legitimate objective of running a profit-
able business. 13 9 Necessarily, these two objectives clash.
If pharmacies have no way to challenge their reimbursement rates
and lose money on each Medicaid prescription, they have no incentive to
participate in the Medicaid program. 140 The pharmacies that withdraw
from Medicaid first are likely to be the pharmacies that proportionately
serve the most Medicaid recipients."'4 Pharmacies that service a large pro-
portion of Medicaid recipients are usually located in an area where Medi-
caid services are utilized the most. 142 If these pharmacies withdraw from
134. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 ("[It is rights, not the broader or vaguer
'benefits' or 'interests' that may be enforced under the authority of that section.")
(emphasis in original).
135. See id. at 276-77 (alleging pendent violation of § 1983 for "release of
personal information to an 'unauthorized person"' in violation of Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA)).
136. Id. at 286-90 (suggesting that FERPA does not "confer the sort of 'individ-
ual entitlement' that is enforceable under § 1983") (emphasis in original).
137. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the § 1983 enforce-
able rights test, see supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
138. See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, The "Ner Federalism" Approach to Medi-
caid: Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms Public
Health, 90 Ky. L.J. 973, 978-79 (2002) (noting historical significance of Medicaid as
providing access to better quality healthcare for poor, elderly and disabled
Americans).
139. See, e.g., Rxfor a Medicaid Nightmare?, supra note 5 ("We believe everyone
should have access to medical care. It'sjust hard to do it below your costs.") (quot-
ing Rite Aid pharmacy spokeswoman).
140. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 547 (3d Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 100 (2002) (Becker, J., dissenting) (commenting that "Medi-
caid recipients' access to healthcare will suffer if provider reimbursement rates are
too low to induce a sufficient number of providers to participate in Medicaid").
141. See id. at 546 (Becker, J., dissenting) (noting "a precipitous drop in the
number of pharmacies in the five-county area who participate in Medicaid since
the inception of HealthChoices").
142. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (referencing plaintiffs' data that due to low
reimbursement rates pharmacies are shutting down and Medicaid recipients "lack
access to pharmacies to the same extent as the general population").
[Vol. 48: p. 13771400
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Medicaid, the neediest Medicaid recipients will suffer the most. Ulti-
mately, this pattern could reduce access to Medicaid services for those who
need it the most, a result contrary to Congress's objective in developing
the Medicaid program.
The consequence of denying pharmacists § 1983 standing is that
Medicaid recipients will be denied access to health care services. 143 Thus,
Congress must decide how to solve this problem. Under current Medicaid
law, and trends in § 1983 law, the Third Circuit's opinion will likely be-
come the prevailing view.
E. Advice to Practitioners: Implications Beyond Medicaid
The Third Circuit's holding in Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n sets forth
new guidelines for practitioners for actions under § 1983 and challenges
to reimbursement rates under the Medicaid Act. 144 Practitioners repre-
senting providers are precluded from challenging reimbursement rates
under § 30(A) in the Third Circuit. 145 This case, however, has broader
implications for other § 1983 actions in the Third Circuit.
The court's reference to early implied right of action cases indicates a
move towards a heightened standard for determining whether a federal
statute confers an enforceable right under § 1983 and whether an individ-
ual or class of individuals are the intended beneficiaries of a statute.
14 6
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed this heightened standard,
holding that in order for a right to be enforceable, it must be "unambigu-
ously conferred." 14 7 Accordingly, practitioners who argue that a statute is
enforceable under § 1983 must point to specific statutory language confer-
ring a benefit on an individual or a class of individuals; the statute must
also contain "rights-creating language."
148
143. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 547 (Becker, J., dissenting) (noting
congressional concern for adequate reimbursement to providers); see also Press Re-
lease, Kentucky Pharmacists Association, sufpra note 5 (suggesting that Medicaid
patients might not have access to pharmacies if low reimbursement rates force
pharmacies to close).
144. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 541-42 (holding that § 30(A) is not
intended to benefit providers and therefore that providers may not assert § 30(A)
claim under § 1983).
145. See id. (eliminating § 1983 remedy for providers).
146. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002) (adopting im-
plied fight of action standard similarly used in Third Circuit's decision).
147. See id. at 2279 ("[l1f Congress wishes to create new rights enforceable
under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms-no less and no more
than what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an im-
plied private right of action.").
148. See, e.g., id. (refusing to find FERPA created enforceable right because it
lacked "rights creating language"). Specific legislative history demonstrating con-
gressional intent is also important under this heightened standard. See id. at 2277
(looking closely at statutory language).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's holding in Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n fore-
closes the ability of Medicaid providers to assert a § 1983 action for viola-
tions of § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act. The court's action follows logically
from Congress's repeal of the Boren Amendment. Given that prior case
law allowing Medicaid provider suits for violations of § 30(A) relied prima-
rily on analogies to the Boren Amendment, the court acted properly in
modifying this doctrine in light of Boren's repeal. The practical conse-
quences of this decision, however, raise larger concerns. The court's deci-
sion may have adverse policy implications in that providers might decide
to withdraw from Medicaid due to inadequate reimbursement, resulting in
reduced Medicaid benefits to recipients.
Meredith Warner Nissen
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